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THE SECRETARY’S EMAILS: THE INTERSECTION OF 
TRANSPARENCY, SECURITY, AND TECHNOLOGY 
Joshua Jacobson* 
Abstract 
Transparency laws are designed to inform the public of government 
workings and to hold government officials accountable to the people. The 
emergence of email has amplified the government’s communicative 
abilities and simultaneously created major challenges for records 
management. These challenges were put on full display when it was 
revealed that Hillary Clinton exclusively used a private email address and 
server for government business while serving as Secretary of State. The 
email arrangement Clinton used was permissible under the law at that 
time, and despite recent changes, government employees may still use 
private email for non-classified correspondence so long as the messages 
are copied or forwarded to an official government account.  
This Note argues that the present system fails to retain a significant 
number of government records and puts government email records at risk. 
Requiring government employees to oversee their own emails results in 
a conflict of interest. Additionally, records housed on private servers may 
have inadequate security protections and thus be at risk to hackers. A 
paradigm shift is needed to ensure that the ever-expanding number of 
digital communications are preserved and protected. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 2015, the New York Times reported that Hillary Clinton 
had exclusively used a private email address and server during her time 
as Secretary of State.1 The ensuing controversy dominated newspaper 
headlines for months and led some to call for criminal prosecution.2 
While Clinton responded by turning over thousands of emails, her staff 
deleted 31,000 emails that it deemed personal.3 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Michael S. Schmidt, Hillary Clinton Used Personal Email Account at State Dept., 
Possibly Breaking Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/pol 
itics/hillary-clintons-use-of-private-email-at-state-department-raises-flags.html. 
 2. See, e.g., Sen. Chuck Grassley: Hillary Could Be Charged in Email Case, NEWSMAX 
(Mar. 31, 2015, 6:47 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/charles-grassley-hillary-clinton-
private-email/2015/03/31/id/635635/. 
 3. Michael S. Schmidt, Justice Dept. Says Hillary Clinton Had Authority to Delete Certain 
Emails, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/us/justice-dept-says-
hillary-clinton-had-authority-to-delete-certain-emails.html. 
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Strictly speaking, it appears that Clinton’s email setup complied with 
the letter of the law4—albeit probably not the spirit.5 While Clinton was 
Secretary of State, the law permitted private email use for 
communications involving government business and did not require that 
government employees transfer official emails on private accounts to 
government servers.6  
This Note does not suggest that Clinton’s private email practices were 
better or worse than those of other government officials. To be sure, 
Clinton was not the first Secretary of State to use a private email address 
for government business. Colin Powell relied on a personal email account 
for communications with “American officials and ambassadors and 
foreign leaders” during his term as Secretary of State.7 A recent 
investigation discovered classified information in some of those emails.8 
Furthermore, a recent survey suggests that many government employees 
use private email accounts for business.9 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Id. This is not to say that Clinton complied with the law if she knowingly, or with gross 
negligence, sent emails containing classified information on a private server. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 793(f) (2012); Laurie L. Levenson, Clinton’s Email: Unwise, But Likely Not Criminal, NAT’L 
L.J., Sept. 21, 2015, LEXIS. Another potentially applicable statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1924, which 
prohibits removing classified documents “with the intent to retain such documents or materials at 
an unauthorized location.” After an investigation, FBI Director James Comey recommended not 
prosecuting Clinton, concluding that “no reasonable prosecutor” would bring charges. Press Release, 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey on the Investigation of 
Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System (July 5, 2016), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/statement-by-fbi-director-james-b-comey-on-the-
investigation-of-secretary-hillary-clinton2019s-use-of-a-personal-e-mail-system. Notwithstanding 
the FBI’s recommendation, Comey admonished Clinton’s “extremely reckless” email practices. 
Id.  
 5. See Transparency and Open Government, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), in 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Transparency 
promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their Government is 
doing.”). Preserving official emails on a private server also deviated from guidelines set forth in 
the National Archives and Records Administration Bulletin suggesting that emails be preserved 
in a manner that would “[p]ermit easy and timely retrieval.” NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., 
NARA BULL. NO. 2008-05, GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE USE OF E-MAIL ARCHIVING 
APPLICATIONS TO STORE E-MAIL (2008), https://www.archives.gov/records-
mgmt/bulletins/2008/2008-05.html, superseded by NARA BULL. NO. 2011-03 (2010), 
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2011/2011-03.html.   
 6. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 7. Josh Gerstein & Tarini Parti, Colin Powell Relied on Personal Emails While Secretary 
of State, POLITICO (Mar. 3, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/colin-powell-
personal-email-secretary-of-state-115707.  
 8. Ken Dilanian, Rice Aides, Powell Also Got Classified Info on Personal Emails, MSNBC 
(Feb. 4, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/rice-aides-powell-also-got-classified-
info-personal-emails. 
 9. Sharyl Attkisson, High-Ranking Federal Officials’ History of Using Personal Email for 
Government Business, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 8, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/03/08/high-
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Regardless, Clinton’s practices exposed a gaping hole in transparency 
laws in the United States: government officials could conduct their 
official duties from a private email account and personally retain their 
email records until someone made a formal request. This gap allowed 
Clinton’s staff—instead of independent State Department employees—
to decide for itself what should be disclosed when a formal records 
request was made.10  
Government employees using their private email accounts for 
business is inherently troubling. By communicating outside proper 
channels, government employees undermine public and institutional 
oversight and create an incomplete historical record.11 Furthermore, the 
practice leaves potentially sensitive information vulnerable to hackers.12  
Recent amendments to transparency laws sought to bring more 
records under direct government control,13 but the fox is still guarding the 
hen house. Public officials are charged with preserving their own emails 
for later public inspection. Allowing officials to monitor themselves 
creates the obvious problem that they will selectively choose which 
records to preserve, neglecting to preserve records that might hurt their 
interests if made public.14  
Moreover, the media’s intense scrutiny of Clinton’s email revealed 
the significant shortcomings of the State Department’s information 
technology (IT) systems, as well as other governmental IT systems.15 
Today, many government employees use private email because using 
their official government email is inconvenient and inefficient.16 Further, 
numerous hacks against government agencies have also undermined 
public confidence in government IT.  
                                                                                                                     
ranking-federal-officials-history-using-personal-email-government-business/ (noting that thirty-
three percent of the survey respondents said they “use personal email for government business at 
least sometimes”); Brody Mullins, Survey: Many Government Employees Use Personal Email for 
Work, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Sept. 1, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/
09/01/survey-many-government-employees-use-personal-email-for-work/ (discussing a similar 
survey in which “about 33% of [respondents] said they used their personal accounts for work 
email at least occasionally”). 
 10. See Schmidt, supra note 3. 
 11. See infra Section III.A. 
 12. See, e.g., Byron Tau, Hillary Clinton’s Private Email Server Was Subject to Attempted 
Attacks, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clintons-private-email-server-was-
subject-to-attempted-attacks-1444323907 (last updated Oct. 9, 2015, 10:36 AM). 
 13. See Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-187, 
128 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). 
 14. See infra notes 113–156 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Section IV.C. 
 16. Clay Johnson, Hillary’s Email, MEDIUM (Mar. 3, 2015), https://medium.com/@cjoh/
hillary-s-email-858ccfc48277#.ka72t7uwj. 
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If the status quo remains, inadequate regulation will continue to 
hamstring government transparency and record keeping. This Note 
analyzes the current regulatory scheme and proposes a solution to ensure 
more exacting email retention and secure email regulation. Part I explores 
the purposes of transparency laws. Part II outlines the laws currently 
governing creation, retention, and disclosure of government records—
with an emphasis on email records. Part III explains how the current 
email retention framework fails to address the security and conflict-of-
interest issues present and is thus inadequate. Finally, Part IV proposes a 
two-pronged solution: a ban on private email use for government business 
and increased government spending for IT. 
I.  PURPOSES OF TRANSPARENCY LAWS 
Government transparency laws rest on the principle that citizens 
should have access to information regarding their government’s 
activities.17 Many rationales have been offered to justify transparency 
laws. Among them are the public’s interest in monitoring government 
actors, providing input and feedback to government entities, and having 
a complete documentary record of governmental activity.18 
One central purpose of government-transparency laws is to facilitate 
public access to government information.19 An informed citizenry has 
long been thought of as a check on excessive executive power.20 In 
theory, transparency allows the public to “monitor government activity 
and hold officials, particularly incompetent and corrupt ones, accountable 
for their actions.”21 Transparency may also improve governance by 
facilitating review of and input on government actions by the public at 
large.22 
Another important reason for government record keeping is the 
informational value of documenting government transactions, policies, 
                                                                                                                     
 17. WENDY GINSBERG ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42817, GOVERNMENT 
TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY: AN EXAMINATION OF MEANING AND ITS USE IN THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 1–2 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42817.pdf. 
 18. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 899–900 (2006). 
 19. About FOIA, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/open/foia (last updated Nov. 20, 
2014). 
 20. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). But see Mark Fenster, Transparency in Search of a Theory, 18 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 
150 (2015) (arguing that the theory and assumptions underlying transparency’s benefits are 
flawed). 
 21. Fenster, supra note 18, at 899. 
 22. Id. at 900. 
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procedures, operations, and so on.23 Preserved historical records can thus 
be examined and later used to understand past and present governmental 
operations.24 
The passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)25 capped off 
a decade-long movement to enact legislation vesting private citizens with 
access to government information.26 The FOIA’s enactment came despite 
consistent executive branch opposition.27 This conflict illustrates the 
tension between transparency objectives and legitimate security concerns 
that follow the opening of the government’s files to the public. 
II.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
This Note focuses on the three transparency statutes regulating 
government agencies and officials: the FOIA, the Federal Records Act 
(FRA),28 and the Presidential Records Act (PRA).29 These statutes can be 
understood as serving different and exclusive functions—regulating the 
creation and retention of records on the one hand and regulating their 
disclosure on the other.30 While the FOIA regulates disclosure 
practices,31 it sets no record-keeping standards.32 Instead, the FRA and 
PRA govern record-keeping practices, with each covering different types 
                                                                                                                     
 23. WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43072, COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT 
FEDERAL RECORDS AND RELATED AGENCY REQUIREMENTS 2, 5 (2015), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43072.pdf. 
 24. WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40238, THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT: 
BACKGROUND AND RECENT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/
R40238.pdf. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)). 
 26. See Thomas Blanton, Freedom of Information at 40, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (July 4, 
2006), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.htm. 
 27. See id. When President Johnson signed the FOIA, he preemptively called for measured 
use of the law with a signing statement cautioning against disclosure of military secrets and 
investigative files, among other things. Statement by the President Upon Signing the “Freedom 
of Information Act,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 316 (July 4, 1966). Executive officials were not the FOIA’s 
only critics; then-Professor Antonin Scalia forcefully argued that the FOIA is fundamentally 
flawed and that its costs vastly outweigh its benefits. See Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of 
Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14, 16–19. 
 28. Federal Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-849, 64 Stat. 583 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). 
 29. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as 
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–09). 
 30. Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 31. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980) 
(explaining that the FOIA ensures private access to certain government records). 
 32. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 345 (“FOIA . . . is a disclosure statute, and a disclosure 
statute only; it imposes no obligations and provides no guidance for the creation or disposal of 
particular records.”). 
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of records created by different entities.33 Material governed by the FRA 
and PRA is subject to the disclosure mechanisms of the FOIA.34 
A.  Record Disclosure: Freedom of Information Act 
At its most basic level, the FOIA vests the public with the “right to 
access information from the federal government.”35 The FOIA was only 
necessary because the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently rejected the 
notion that the First Amendment guarantees citizens a right to access 
government information.36 In the absence of a constitutional right of 
private citizens to access government information, the FOIA has supplied 
that right.37  
The FOIA’s legislative history is replete with references to Congress’s 
desire to vindicate the public right to access information.38 And although 
the Supreme Court has recognized a right to receive information,39 it has 
“relied on FOIA, not the Constitution, to protect access to other 
government information.”40 The FOIA thus serves as the primary vehicle 
enabling the public to obtain information sought from the government.41 
Section (a) of the FOIA generally requires that agencies make certain 
information available to the public42 and disclose records in response to 
requests.43 Section (b) enumerates nine classes of information exempt 
from disclosure and provides procedures for redacting exempted material 
from documents capable of partial disclosure.44 The exemptions protect 
                                                                                                                     
 33. The FRA applies to “each Federal agency.” 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012). “[T]he term 
‘Federal agency’ means any executive agency or any establishment in the legislative or judicial 
branch of the Government” and does not mean the Supreme Court, Congress, or Architect of the 
Capitol. Id. § 2901(14). The PRA, however, regulates “Presidential records,” defined as 
“documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the 
President, [the President’s] immediate staff,” or someone advising or assisting the President. Id. 
§ 2201(2). 
 34. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3), (f)(1). 
 35. See What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/ (last visited Sept. 30 , 2016). 
 36. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly 
made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA 
laws.”); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1978) (“Neither the First Amendment nor 
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of 
information within the government’s control.”). 
 37. See Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and 
the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2012). 
 38. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 37–38 (1965). 
 39. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
 40. Susan Nevelow Mart, Let the People Know the Facts: Can Government Information 
Removed from the Internet Be Reclaimed?, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 7, 9 (2006). 
 41. See Sullivan, supra note 37, at 66. 
 42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 43. Id. § 552(a)(3). 
 44. Id. § 552(b). 
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from disclosure records containing, for example, classified information, 
trade secrets, and personal information.45 The FOIA grants district courts 
authority to enjoin government agencies “from withholding agency 
records” and to order the production of improperly withheld records.46  
The FOIA applies to “government agencies,” defined as any 
department, government corporation, or other creation of the executive 
branch.47 Unlike the term “government agency,” the FOIA does not 
define “record,” although it makes clear that the FOIA covers 
electronically stored information that would otherwise be a record.48  
The Supreme Court has borrowed the definition of “agency record” 
from other statutes to determine what records the FOIA covers.49 Records 
can thus be described as “documentary materials . . . made or received by 
an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in 
connection with the transaction of public business.”50 
Additionally, to be subject to the FOIA, requested materials must be 
in the possession of the agency when the request is made.51 This 
possession requirement was the subject of the landmark Supreme Court 
case Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.52 The 
Court in Kissinger held that courts may only intervene when “an agency 
has (1) ‘improperly’; (2) ‘withheld’; (3) ‘agency records.’”53 When an 
agency record is removed from the agency’s possession before a FOIA 
request, the agency lacks the possession necessary to withhold the 
record.54 This means that records removed from an agency’s control are 
beyond FOIA’s grasp. This possession requirement evinces FOIA’s 
narrow focus of providing access to records rather than directing their 
creation or maintenance.55  
                                                                                                                     
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 47. Id. §§ 551(a), 552(f)(1). The FOIA regulations do not govern Congress, the courts, and 
several other bodies. Id. § 551(a).  
 48. Id. § 552(f)(2)(A). 
 49. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 145 (1989); Forsham v. Harris, 
445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980). 
 50. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added) (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 3301). 
 51. See Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he agency must be in control of the requested 
materials at the time the FOIA request is made. By control we mean that the materials have come 
into the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties.”). 
 52. 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980) (“The [FOIA] does not obligate agencies to create or retain 
documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and 
retained.”). 
 53. Id. at 150 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). 
 54. Id. at 150–51. 
 55. Id. at 152. 
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B.  Record Retention 
Despite its foundational importance, the FOIA is not without its 
limitations. Its reach is limited to records within an agency’s control.56 
This limitation is, for the most part, mitigated by statutes mandating the 
preservation of records. The FRA and the PRA are principally concerned 
with the handling, creation, and preservation of government records and 
information.57 These laws bolster the FOIA by ensuring the preservation 
of records subject to disclosure.58  
1.  Federal Records Act 
The FRA governs executive agencies’ creation, management, and 
disposal of records.59 The FRA facilitates public access to records by 
ensuring their retention so they may be available for subsequent FOIA 
requests. After all, “proper records management is the backbone of open 
Government.”60 
Unlike the FOIA, the FRA explicitly defines “records.”61 The FRA-
provided definition of records, like the definition the Supreme Court 
attributed to the FOIA, is expansive.62 The 2014 FRA amendment shifted 
the emphasis away from the medium in which the information was stored 
to the information itself.63 Accordingly, the definition of agency record 
refers “generically to ‘recorded information.’”64 Emails clearly fit this 
broad category and are thus subject to preservation.65  
For the purposes of this Note’s analysis, the 2014 FRA amendments’ 
treatment of email records is most relevant. Before the amendments, the 
law required government employees to preserve email records, but it did 
not require them to preserve the records in an official location—meaning 
that officials such as Secretary Clinton were free to create and maintain 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. 
 57. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284–85 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 58. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989) (“Several federal statutes 
combine to ensure the permanent retention and public disclosure of a broad variety of federal 
‘records.’”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 59. The “Federal Records Act” refers to four U.S. Code chapters governing federal records: 
(1) National Archives and Record Administration, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101–20 (2012); (2) Records 
Management by the Archivist of the United States, §§ 2901–11; (3) Records Management by 
Federal Agencies, §§ 3101–07; (4) Disposal of Records, §§ 3301–14. 
 60. Memorandum on Managing Government Records, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 
(Nov. 28, 2011). 
 61. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301. 
 62. See id.; Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980). 
 63. GINSBERG, supra note 23, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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email records entirely on private servers.66 The amended FRA requires 
that agency officials copy or forward copies of records created or 
received on an unofficial email account to an official government email 
account.67 Under this subsection, employees are free to conduct official 
business from private accounts so long as these messages make it to a 
government email inbox within the allotted time frame.68 
Government employees are not completely free, however, to send 
confidential information on private email accounts. A number of laws 
impose penalties for knowingly or negligently disclosing classified 
material.69 Indeed, much of the Clinton controversy centered on whether 
Clinton sent or received classified information on her private server.70 
The FRA only mandates retention of records—non-records need not 
be forwarded to a government email.71 For instance, emails relating to 
professional meetings that do not document agency activity do not 
constitute records.72 However, emails relating to both personal matters 
and government business constitute records.73 Naturally, these 
parameters create ambiguity as to which emails government employees 
must forward. 
Federal agency heads are tasked with ensuring FRA compliance.74 
Agency chiefs “shall make and preserve records” documenting the 
agency’s activities and must establish a records-management program.75 
It is their responsibility to safeguard against the improper removal or 
destruction of records and to report any discovered removal or destruction 
of records.76 The FRA provides guidelines for the proper destruction of 
agency records.77 Agency records may not be removed or destroyed by 
other means.78 Intentional violators who fail to forward records created 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Hillary Clinton’s Personal Email Use Came Before Recent 
Rule Changes, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-
clintons-personal-email-use-came-before-recent-rule-changes-1425415233. 
 67. See 44 U.S.C. § 2911(a). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(f), 1924(a). 
 70. Elizabeth Goitein, Five Myths About Classified Information, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-classified-information/2015
/09/18/a164c1a4-5d72-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html. 
 71. See 44 U.S.C. § 2911. 
 72. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. RECORDS MGMT., E-MAIL MANAGEMENT 8, 
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/toolkit/pdf/ID317.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 73. 36 C.F.R. § 1222.20(b)(2) (2015) (“If information about private matters and agency 
business appears in a received document, the document is a Federal record.”). 
 74. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–06. 
 75. Id. §§ 3101–02. 
 76. Id. § 3106. 
 77. Id. §§ 3301–16. 
 78. Id. § 3314. 
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or received on a private email account are subject to non-criminal 
punishment ranging from a week’s suspension to firing.79 
2.  Presidential Records Act 
The PRA governs the creation, retention, and eventual archival or 
destruction of records “created or received by the President, [the 
President’s] immediate staff,” or other executive individuals working in 
an official capacity for the executive branch.80 The PRA and the FRA 
cover a mutually exclusive set of records but serve the same general 
function.81 They each direct covered individuals to preserve certain 
records created or received while conducting official business and 
provide for specific disposal procedures.82 
Critically, the PRA adopts the same procedures as the FRA for 
preserving records created or received on an unofficial email address83: 
Employees who send or receive an official record on an unofficial email 
account must either copy or forward the email to an official email account 
within twenty days.84 The disciplinary protocol the PRA establishes for 
violators is identical to that of the FRA.85 
C.  Relationship Between Disclosure and Retention Statutes 
The FRA and PRA govern the way government agencies and the 
executive branch collect, preserve, and dispose of federal records.86 The 
FOIA, on the other hand, provides a mechanism for accessing executive 
branch and federal agency records.87 The FRA and PRA can thus properly 
be viewed “as ensuring the proper collection and retention” of materials 
to be later disclosed under the FOIA.88 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE PERMISSION PARADIGM 
As currently formulated, both the PRA and the FRA permit covered 
employees to conduct official duties on private email addresses so long 
as an official email account receives a copy of the record.89 Thus, covered 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. § 2911(b). Even stiffer punishment may be imposed on a person found guilty of 
“willfully and unlawfully” concealing, removing, or destroying a federal record. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2071(b). Violators face fines, up to three years imprisonment, or both. Id. 
 80. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–09. 
 81. Id. § 2201(2)(B) (noting that the statute does not cover “official records of an agency”). 
 82. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284–86 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 83. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209, 2911. 
 84. Id. § 2209. 
 85. Id. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b). 
 86. See supra Section II.B. 
 87. See supra Section II.A. 
 88. GINSBERG, supra note 23, at 11. 
 89. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b). 
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officials retain discretion as to when private emails contain subject matter 
that requires retention. This formulation creates perverse incentives for 
government employees and is fraught with security risks. This Part will 
analyze some of the inherent problems of a permission-with-regulation 
regime. 
A.  Rule Breaking 
Letting a government employee decide which emails to retain creates 
a conflict of interest. The public has an interest in the most disclosure 
practicable, while government employees have an interest in disclosure 
that will not be personally damaging. The public and the government 
employees’ record-keeping goals are therefore at odds.  
1.  A Useful Analogy: The Classification System 
An illustrative example of government employees’ anti-disclosure 
posture is the classification system. The classification system exists to 
prevent disclosure of sensitive information that could injure national 
security.90 It generally consists of rules and procedures that guide the 
protection of government records containing sensitive or confidential 
information.91 Despite the straightforward mandate of information 
classification,92 it has long been recognized that the classification system 
conceals a great deal of documents that could hardly be characterized as 
injurious to national security if disclosed.93 For instance, intelligence 
agencies labeled as “top secret” an email sent to Hillary Clinton that 
included discussion on a “widely known and discussed” drone strike.94 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2012). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 402–04 (2009); Jeffrey Toobin, Hillary’s Problem: The Government 
Classifies Everything, NEW YORKER (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/hillarys-problem-the-government-classifies-everything. In a 2010 hearing, National 
Security Archive Director Thomas Blanton estimated that approximately fifty to ninety percent 
of classified material should not be classified. Hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and 
Constitutional Implications of Wikileaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 160 (2010) (statement of Thomas Blanton, Director, National Security Archive), 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20101216/Blanton101216.pdf. 
 94. Bradley Klapper & Ken Dilanian, AP EXCLUSIVE: Top Secret Clinton Emails Include 
Drone Talk, AP: BIG STORY (Aug. 14, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
b54a250a40e9410baaaca5f9fb58ea94/ap-exclusive-top-secret-clinton-emails-include-drone-talk 
(“Neither of the two emails sent to Hillary Rodham Clinton now labeled by intelligence agencies 
as ‘top secret’ contained information that would jump out to experts as particularly sensitive, 
according to several government officials.”). 
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For decades, commentators have lamented abuses of the classification 
system and “excessive government secrecy.”95 Numerous task forces, 
commissions, and committees have diagnosed government over-
classification as a problem and suggested solutions.96 Few of these 
initiatives, however, have significantly reduced the excesses of 
government classification.97 In 2014, executive agencies completed over 
seventy-seven million classification actions.98  
The properties and structure of the classification system can partly 
account for the over-classification problem. Critically, more than four 
million government officials have authority to classify documents.99 
Further, the categories under which government employees may classify 
documents are so vague as to cover a broad range of documents that 
would have no bearing on national security if released.100 These reasons 
alone, however, do not evince a clear rationale for why government 
employees consistently err on the side of over-classification rather than 
under-classification.101 
Principal reasons for consistent over-classification have more to do 
with the interests and motivations of the individuals participating in the 
classification system than the structure of the system itself. One recent 
article pointed to “bureaucratic secrecy”102 and “political secrecy”103 as 
drivers of improper classification practices. Accounting for these 
interests, over-classification has little to do with national security.104 
Instead, some of the most prevalent factors include suspicion that 
disclosure is inherently riskier than non-disclosure, convenience, desires 
to avoid controversy and accountability, and political expediency.105 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Aftergood, supra note 93, at 404. 
 96. Id. at 404–06. 
 97. See id. 
 98. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2014 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 5 (2014), 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2014-annual-report.pdf. Maintaining the classification 
system cost roughly $14.98 billion in 2014. Id. at 24. 
 99. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2014 REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE 
DETERMINATIONS 5 tbl.1.3 (2015); Goitein, supra note 70. 
 100. Fenster, supra note 18, at 923 (noting the ease of fitting a “document’s information 
within one of the broad and vague categories provided by the Executive Order establishing the 
classification system”). 
 101. Id. at 923–24 (“Tellingly, the inadvertent release of classified documents is far rarer 
than the inadvertent classification of information that does not warrant protection.”). 
 102. Aftergood, supra note 93, at 402 (noting the “tendency of bureaucracies . . . to hoard 
information”). 
 103. Id. at 403 (“[Political secrecy] exploits the generally accepted legitimacy of genuine 
national security interests in order to advance a self-serving agenda, to evade controversy, or to 
thwart accountability.”). 
 104. See Goitein, supra note 70. 
 105. See Aftergood, supra note 93, at 402–03; Fenster, supra note 18, at 923. 
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Taken together, classification policies and inherently biased classifiers 
have produced a mass of uncertainty and excessive government secrecy. 
The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)106 
example illustrates these classification tendencies. Created by executive 
order in 1995, the ISCAP is comprised of senior-level representatives of 
the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the National Archives, and the National Security Council.107 The 
Panel adjudicates appeals of agency decisions denying declassification 
requests.108 Between 1996 and 2014, the Panel declassified some or all of 
the requested documents in 1,387 of 1,960 appeals heard.109 To put this 
in context, federal courts, which generally defer to executive decisions, 
hear similar appeals but “almost never overturn agency classification 
decisions.”110 
Reconciling the success of the Panel with the fact that its members are 
the very organizations whose decisions are being questioned requires 
analysis of the Panel members’ interests. While political and bureaucratic 
secrecy drive over-classification within agencies, those unique 
organizational interests are not persuasive to the Panel as a whole.111 
Instead, the Panel members’ joint interest in national security guides 
decisions whether to declassify, and the Panel overturns classification 
decisions based on illegitimate factors.112  
It is likely that the factors contributing to over-classification of 
government records would similarly cause abuses of the FRA and the 
PRA’s guidelines for private email retention. As a preliminary matter, the 
government employees making classification decisions are the same 
individuals governed by records-retention laws. They are demonstrably 
risk-averse and generally err on the side of self-preservation through 
over-classification.113 Thus, a government employee who classifies 
records unnecessarily in the interest of self-preservation would likely 
neglect to forward potentially damaging emails sent or received on a 
private email address even if the email was an official record. That is, a 
government employee forced to choose114 whether an email is an official 
                                                                                                                     
 106. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 352–53 (1996), reprinted as amended in 50 
U.S.C. § 435 (2012). 
 107. Id. The represented agencies are among “the most prolific classifiers.” Aftergood, supra 
note 93, at 407. 
 108. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, 319–20 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435. 
 109. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 98, at 22. 
 110. Aftergood, supra note 93, at 407 (noting that courts have overturned agency 
classification decisions in “no more than a few dozen FOIA cases over the past thirty years”). 
 111. Id. at 408–09. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 402–03; Fenster, supra note 18, at 923. 
 114. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text. 
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record would more often than not neglect to preserve it on an official 
email account, regardless of whether it is actually an official record.115 
Without modification to the law, such individuals will retain only emails 
that pose no threat to their interests. 
It should be noted, however, that this is an imperfect analogy. Over-
classification is a problem, but the generous classification decisions 
themselves are not illegal because of the vague classification categories 
that make the system susceptible to abuse.116 On the other hand, failing 
to copy or forward potentially damaging emails covered by the PRA or 
the FRA to an official email account is illegal.117 This distinction between 
rule bending and rule breaking is important to note in predicting the 
observance of the current email-retention scheme. However, the same 
interests remain prevalent and would likely cause a significant number of 
emails to elude preservation. 
2.  Classification’s Impact on Email 
Government email regulation is more than just analogous to the 
classification system—the two systems are highly intertwined. Agency 
rules mandate that government employees must transmit classified 
information only via classified networks.118 Sending classified 
information on a network the agency has not approved to handle 
classified messages may result in criminal sanctions or a security 
violation.119 
Given the documented abuse of the classification system, the 
government’s stance against transmission of classified information on 
unsecure networks is at odds with its current allowance for official emails 
on private accounts. The Clinton email controversy speaks directly to this 
issue. Ever since Clinton’s emails were made public, the State 
Department has engaged in a public disagreement with intelligence 
agencies and Congress over whether and when the emails on Clinton’s 
server were classified.120 This disagreement begs the question: If 
government agencies cannot agree on what information belongs on a 
                                                                                                                     
 115. See Aftergood, supra note 93, at 402–04; Fenster, supra note 18, at 923. 
 116. See Fenster, supra note 18, at 923. 
 117. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b) (2012). 
 118. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army, Regulation 380-5, Information Security Program § 8, at 
90–91 (Sept. 29, 2000), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar380-5.pdf. 
 119. See id.; supra note 4. 
 120. See Eric Lichtblau & Stevn Lee Myers, Agencies Clashed on Classification of Clinton 
Email, Inquiry Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/us/politics/hillary-clinton-emails-fbi.html; Steven Lee 
Myers & Mark Mazzetti, Agencies Battle over What Is ‘Top Secret’ in 
Hillary Clinton’s Emails, N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/us/pol
itics/agencies-battle-over-what-is-top-secret-in-hillary-clintons-emails.html. 
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secure government server, is it reasonable to expect individual 
government employees to make this determination correctly?  
Because the classification system involves a great deal of uncertainty 
as to what is and is not classified, email regulations should not distinguish 
between classified and unclassified content. Allowing official emails on 
private email accounts creates additional uncertainty and renders 
government employees vulnerable to allegations of mishandling 
classified information because of flexible classification parameters.121 
3.  Undermining the Objectives of Transparency Laws 
Non-compliance with the PRA and the FRA’s email guidelines 
prevents those statutes from achieving their purpose. The public cannot 
effectively monitor the government when many government emails can 
easily be kept out of reach.122 An incomplete record limits public review 
and criticism of government activities and reduces the “informational 
value” of available government documents.123 Since governmental 
entities do not possess records that government employees fail to copy to 
an official email address, the FOIA would be circumvented as to the 
unforwarded records.124 
While the classification system doubtless serves an important 
function, excessive use of classification hinders the objectives advanced 
by transparency laws.125 And just as an agency official with classification 
authority can shield information from public scrutiny, any government 
official who transacts official business on a private email address can 
similarly keep the substance of his emails secret by neglecting to 
forward.126 
However, even when a government official complies with the PRA 
and the FRA’s email mandates by copying official emails to government 
email addresses,127 accessing these emails after the fact may be 
impractical if they are not all forwarded to the same email address.128 
FOIA requests often require officials to search thousands of records to 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See Fenster, supra note 18, at 923; Toobin, supra note 93. 
 122. See supra Part I. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See supra Section II.A. 
 125. Alexander M. Taber, Note, Information Control: Making Secrets and Keeping Them 
Safe, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 581, 594–95 (2015). 
 126. See supra Section III.A. 
 127. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(a), 2911(a) (2012). 
 128. See, e.g., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., NARA BULL. NO. 2011-03, GUIDANCE 
CONCERNING THE USE OF E-MAIL ARCHIVING APPLICATIONS TO STORE E-MAIL (2010), 
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2011/2011-03.html (requiring email record-
keeping systems that facilitate the “grouping of related records” and “[p]ermit easy and timely 
retrieval” of records). 
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find responsive documents,129 and when the email records are preserved 
in tens or hundreds of different email inboxes, fulfilling a FOIA request 
becomes impractical.130 Therefore, even compliance with records-
retention statutes may circumvent the FOIA. 
B.  Security 
Allowing government employees to conduct official business from 
private email accounts on private servers results in inconsistent—and 
probably insufficient—security of potentially sensitive information. The 
prevalence of hacking has created an environment where digital 
information is less secure than ever. In such a threat-ridden online world, 
allowing individual employees to take email security into their own hands 
is a risky endeavor. 
Hackers and other nefarious parties threaten the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of email—the primary form of communication 
for many.131 Some of the most significant recent hacks originated via 
email.132 Two notable tactics hackers use to perpetrate cyber attacks are 
spear phishing and social engineering. Spear phishing is the process by 
which hackers send seemingly personal emails to their target utilizing 
publicly available personal information in a bid to convince the target to 
disclose valuable information.133 In the hacking context, social 
engineering is “the art of manipulating people so they give up 
confidential information.”134  
                                                                                                                     
 129. See What Is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Why Should You Care?, NAT’L 
TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/about/foia/Pages/freedom_and_information.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 130. Lauren Carroll, Hillary Clinton’s Email: Did She Follow All the Rules?, POLITIFACT 
(Mar. 12, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/mar/12/hillary-
clintons-email-did-she-follow-all-rules/. 
 131. PAM COCCA, SANS INST., EMAIL SECURITY THREATS 3 (2005), https://www.sans.org/
reading-room/whitepapers/email/email-security-threats-1540; RADICATI GRP., INC., US EMAIL 
STATISTICS REPORT, 2016-2020, at 2–3 (2016), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/US-Email-Statistics-Report-2016-2020-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
 132. See Richard Chirgwin, Ubiquiti Stung US$46.7 Million in E-mail Spoofing Fraud, THE 
REGISTER (Aug. 9, 2015, 10:44 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/09/ubiquiti_stung_
by_email_spoofing_fraud/; Gerry Smith, Massive Target Hack Traced Back to Phishing Email, 
HUFFPOST BUS. (Feb. 12, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/12/target-
hack_n_4775640.html. 
 133. Spear Phishers Angling to Steal Your Financial Info, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION 
(Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/april/spearphishing_040109. 
 134. Social Engineering: A Hacking Story, INFOSEC INST. (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/social-engineering-a-hacking-story/. Social engineering 
attacks can target individuals or service providers. For the purposes of this Note, attacks against 
service providers are most relevant because attacks seeking information directly from the targeted 
individual are possible regardless of the entity servicing the email account. 
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While serving as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s private email 
was reportedly subjected to at least five phishing attempts.135 The attacks 
were apparently not successful, but they underscore the risk that a 
careless click could have caused a leak of sensitive information.136 Some 
have suggested that Clinton’s email setup was especially vulnerable to 
hacks because it was independently maintained by Clinton and her staff 
and unprotected by State Department security staff—or even by security 
measures offered by private email providers like Microsoft or Yahoo.137  
Email accounts maintained on independent servers are not the only 
accounts at risk. Personal email accounts hosted by Internet companies 
are also targeted. The recent hack of CIA Director John O. Brennan’s 
private email account provides an example of the risks created when 
government officials conduct business on a personal email account 
hosted by Internet companies.138 In a recent address to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Brennan touted the CIA’s efforts to improve cyber 
defenses.139 Yet, months later, a hacker—allegedly a high school 
student—breached Brennan’s personal email account140 and went on to 
release sensitive documents that Brennan had in his personal email 
account’s inbox.141 The hacker claims to have used “social engineering” 
to pose as Brennan and acquire his personal information and email 
credentials from Verizon and AOL.142 The hack on Brennan’s AOL 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Bradley Klapper et al., Emails: Russia-Linked Hackers Tried to Access Clinton Server, 
AP: BIG STORY (Oct. 1, 2015, 2:51 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9160a25f39e14507ab90c9 
77d300dc8b/6000-more-pages-clinton-emails-be-published-wednesday. The malicious emails 
were disguised as speeding tickets from New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Id. 
Downloading the “attachment would have allowed hackers to take over control of [Clinton’s] 
computer.” Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Andy Greenberg, Why Clinton’s Private Email Server Was Such a Security Fail, 
WIRED (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:32 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/clintons-email-server-
vulnerable/. 
 138. Phillip Messing et al., Teen Says He Hacked CIA Director’s AOL Account, N.Y. POST 
(Oct. 18, 2015, 11:40 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/10/18/stoner-high-school-student-says-he-
hacked-the-cia/. 
 139. Director Brennan Speaks at the Council on Foreign Relations, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2015-
speeches-testimony/director-brennan-speaks-at-the-council-on-foreign-relations.html. 
 140. Messing et al., supra note 138. 
 141. Damian Paletta, CIA Director’s Personal Email Allegedly Hacked, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
19, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-directors-personal-email-allegedly-hacked-
1445290540. The hacker released a contact list containing 2,611 email and instant-message 
addresses, including contacts of CIA employees and top intelligence officials. Id. The hacker also 
accessed Brennan’s application for top-secret security clearance, among other sensitive files. Id. 
 142. Kim Zetter, Teen Who Hacked CIA Director’s Email Tells How He Did It, WIRED 
(Oct. 19, 2015, 6:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/hacker-who-broke-into-cia-director-
john-brennan-email-tells-how-he-did-it/. 
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account showed that even those individuals who are keenly aware of the 
dangers posed by cyber threats are nonetheless susceptible to attacks 
when they use personal email accounts. 
As long as government officials transmit valuable information online, 
malicious actors will seek to steal it. This eminent threat requires that 
digital messages be protected with the most secure systems available. The 
types of attacks faced by Clinton’s and Brennan’s personal email 
accounts are commonplace today.143 Allowing government officials to 
transmit official government records on private email accounts has the 
obvious effect of putting these records at unnecessary risk. 
IV.  A SOLUTION: PROHIBITION 
This Note argues that the best way to solve the security and conflict-
of-interest problems discussed above is to prohibit government officials 
from conducting official business on private email accounts. This 
prohibition will limit their ability to sidestep records-retention laws, 
thereby advancing transparency laws’ objectives. Further, sensitive 
information contained in official records would be more secure on official 
email accounts. This ban is also necessary to prevent rampant violations 
of regulations governing classified information. This solution, of course, 
is not perfect, as some rule breaking and security breaches are inevitable; 
however, prohibiting the use of private email accounts will significantly 
improve record preservation and security.  
To facilitate the prohibition of official business on private email 
addresses, government IT capabilities must also be improved. Substantial 
investment in IT would serve to enhance the security and convenience of 
using government email accounts. 
A.  Reducing Rule Breaking 
Prohibiting the use of private email accounts for official business 
would minimize the risk of rule breaking that is all too likely under the 
current permission-with-regulation paradigm.144 This Note’s solution 
would modify the incentives of retention-law compliance by raising the 
cost of non-compliance and making compliance a more attractive option. 
Further, policing prohibition would be more straightforward than 
policing a permission-with-regulation scheme. Finally, this Note’s 
solution will induce officials who nonetheless break the rules and conduct 
official business on private email accounts to break the rules to a lesser 
extent. 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Cyber Crime, FBI.gov, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber (last visited Sept. 30, 
2016). 
 144. See supra Section III.A. 
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1.  Balancing Incentives 
Basic economic principles illustrate why prohibition would deter 
government officials from using private email accounts for official 
business. Legal economists generally view decisions to engage in 
criminal behavior as rational decisions made by individuals who expect 
the benefit of the activity to exceed the cost.145 Thus, criminal behavior 
may be reduced by increasing the cost of the behavior to a level exceeding 
the benefit—ensuring that crime does not pay. 
Basic economic theory presupposes that individuals are rational and 
self-interested.146 Put simply, considerations of costs and benefits 
guide—either implicitly or explicitly—the choices people make.147 
Accordingly, researchers have observed that individuals generally 
engage in more of an activity when the perceived benefits increase and 
engage in less of an activity when the perceived costs increase.148 
Criminal law utilizes these same principles to eliminate socially 
undesirable activities by making the commission of crimes more 
costly.149 Two factors relevant to an individual’s decision whether to 
engage in criminal behavior are the probability of prosecution and the 
severity of punishment.150 Accounting for these factors, two options 
emerge that would appear to reduce the undesirable conduct: (1) 
increasing the probability of prosecution, and (2) increasing the penalties 
levied against offenders.151  
Of the available options, increasing the probability of prosecution 
would likely have the most significant effect on reducing the undesirable 
activity—here, transmission of official government emails on private 
accounts. Studies suggest that probability of enforcement has a far greater 
deterrent effect than severity of punishment.152 The deterrent effect of 
increasing penalties diminishes “rapidly” as the probability of 
                                                                                                                     
 145. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219 (6th ed. 2003). While 
transmitting official government emails on a private email account is not currently illegal, 
adopting this Note’s proposed solution to consider such conduct illegal would substantially reduce 
levels of rule breaking. 
 146. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 54–55 (2007). 
 147. POSNER, supra note 145, at 219. 
 148. Id. at 220; Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 43, 55 (1996). 
 149. POSNER, supra note 145, at 219–20. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 220–21. To be sure, opportunity costs also affect an individual’s behavior. Id. 
at 220. Raising the costs of transmitting official emails on a private server would make alternatives 
like phone calls and in-person meetings a more desirable alternative for individuals seeking to 
avoid the message’s disclosure. See Fenster, supra note 18, at 922.  
 152. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 655, 660 (2006). 
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enforcement falls.153 Increasing the probability of enforcement also 
facilitates a more accurate perception of the costs and benefits of a crime, 
such that would-be criminals are less likely to over- or underestimate the 
risks of criminal activity.154  
With these principles in mind, it should be obvious that materially 
limiting the use of private email accounts for government business must 
involve more than an increase in penalties—though some level of penalty 
increase would probably be beneficial. However, any attempt to improve 
email-record retention should seek to facilitate detection and make 
enforcement of the rule more likely. 
In addition to making rule breaking more costly by raising the 
likelihood of detection and penalties, stigma effects of punishment could 
further reduce the utility of improper email use.155 In the context of high-
ranking government officials, the Hillary Clinton event should serve as a 
strong incentive to keep official emails on government servers. However, 
the same incentive is weaker—at least relative to that of higher ranking 
officials—for low- and mid-level government employees who lack 
political capital but are nonetheless subject to records-retention laws. 
Nonetheless, criminalizing the activity would raise the costs of the 
undesired activity and incentivize compliance with records-retention 
laws. 
This Note suggests implementing the prohibition of official emails on 
private accounts by removing the provisions that shield government 
employees from liability if they copy or forward the message to an 
official account.156 Penalty for violation would be the same as is currently 
contemplated for failure to copy or forward official emails on private 
accounts.157  
The current incentives for officials to use an official government email 
account are low,158 and disobeying the rules is pervasive159 and relatively 
risk-free.160 Penalizing the transmission of official emails on private 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. 
 154. POSNER, supra note 145, at 227. 
 155. HARRISON, supra note 146, at 243. 
 156. For the FRA, this would mean eliminating 44 U.S.C. § 2911(a)(1)–(2), while leaving 
subsection (a) intact before the word “unless.” For the PRA, the change would be the same, but § 
2209(a) would be affected. These modified provisions would attach liability to senders of official 
emails from private email accounts. Of course, liability would be inappropriate for the official 
that receives an unsolicited official email on a private account. 
 157. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b) (2012). 
 158. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 16 (arguing that private email servers are more secure 
and efficient than government servers). 
 159. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 160. Hillary Clinton’s private email setup may have never been noticed were it not for a 
special congressional investigation that failed to uncover any of Clinton’s emails from the State 
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accounts is needed to curtail the rampant rule breaking and create more 
meaningful transparency. 
2.  Simplifying Enforcement 
Policing a prohibition scheme is more manageable than policing a 
permission-with-regulation scheme and would better enable detection of 
violations. First, evidence that a government official failed to use—or 
barely used—an official email address almost certainly establishes a rule 
violation. Proof of an email pertaining to government business sent on a 
private email address would similarly establish a rule violation without 
inquiry into whether the government employee copied or forwarded the 
email within an allotted time frame.161 Mandating official business be 
conducted on official instead of private email accounts would create a 
presumption among officials that any email involving government 
business transmitted on a private email account violates the law.  
Policing rule violations under the current rules is much more difficult. 
As previously discussed, many emails are likely to go unforwarded and 
would thus be impervious to oversight.162 These records, which do not 
end up under government control, are beyond the FOIA’s reach.163 Even 
records forwarded to an official government email account in accordance 
with the rules may be difficult to track down if they are scattered among 
many different inboxes.164 This Note’s solution can overcome these 
challenges by consolidating email records and bringing them under 
government control.165 
Of course, it would be impossible to capture every government 
communication for later public scrutiny. It has long been recognized that 
government actors who prefer secrecy will adapt communication 
mediums to protect information from disclosure.166 For instance, a 
                                                                                                                     
Department. Josh Voorhees, A Crystal-Clear Explanation of Hillary’s Confusing Email Scandal, 
SLATE (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/20/
hillary_clinton_email_scandal_explained.html. Since the Clinton email revelation, there have 
been more discoveries of government employees using private email, and reports indicate that a 
substantial proportion of government employees still use personal email for business and fail to 
preserve such emails with little repercussions. Attkisson, supra note 9. 
 161. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. However, the limited exception 
prescribed below would provide immunity in narrowly defined circumstances. See infra note 171. 
 162. See supra Section III.A. 
 163. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 166. Fenster, supra note 18, at 922, 924 (“When an agency or an individual government 
official prefers to protect information from disclosure, then the agency or official is more likely 
to produce it in a form, circulate it by a method, and/or maintain or destroy it so that the 
information will either fall outside disclosure requirements or avoid detection.”). 
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government official who prefers secrecy may choose to communicate 
telephonically if he perceives an email would involve a high risk of 
disclosure.167 Simply put, perfect information regulation is not possible, 
and at some level, disclosure avoidance is inevitable.168 However, 
prohibiting official business on private email addresses would make 
enforcement more likely, thus increasing the cost of non-compliance. 
3.  Shrinking the Exception to the General Rule 
Any modification to records-retention statutes must provide for the 
reality that access to official email accounts may be impractical at times. 
A server being down169 and a late-night crisis requiring an immediate 
response170 are instances in which transmitting government business on 
a private email address would be warranted. Such exceptions to the 
general prohibition should be narrowly tailored to prescribe procedures 
for these situations, including protocols for preserving these 
communications. It must be made clear, though, that use of personal 
email is a narrow exception to the general rule that government 
employees must use official email accounts for emails involving 
government business.171 
4.  Institutional Oversight 
To effect the change sought by this Note’s solution, institutional 
measures aimed at ensuring compliance should be taken. Noncompliance 
with transparency laws is well documented, and the need for institutional 
oversight in this arena is likewise not a novel concept.172 An example of 
such an institutional oversight mechanism is the recently created Office 
of Government Information Services, which is responsible for counseling 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See id.  
 168. See id. 
 169. GINSBERG, supra note 24, at 6 n.25. 
 170. Carroll, supra note 130 (“High-level officials . . . need the flexibility to sometimes use 
a personal email, such as responding to a national security emergency in the middle of the night.”). 
As discussed infra, increased spending on government IT would facilitate more secure and 
convenient access to government email accounts. Thus, the increased availability of official 
accounts on mobile devices and otherwise should obviate some of the need to use private email 
when government employees are away from their work computer. 
 171. The exception could be simply added by leaving 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(a) and 2911(a) 
intact (i.e., retain the word “unless”) and inserting a subsection (1) stating: “the official electronic 
messaging account of the covered employee is practically inaccessible. Any such electronic 
message shall be copied or forwarded to an official electronic messaging account not later than 
twenty days after the transmission of the original message.” 
 172. See Maria H. Benecki, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act—1987, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 566, 579–80 (describing Congressional hearings and proposals in 1986 and 1987 
regarding the introduction of a FOIA Tribunal or Ombudsman). 
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agencies on FOIA compliance, suggesting policy changes, and mediating 
disputes between requesters and agencies.173 An impartial ombudsman 
operating outside the ambit of the regulated agencies would give this 
Note’s solution the operational capability to influence email retention. 
Assuming a record is preserved, illegitimate concealment of the 
record is unlikely, because FOIA administrators generally have no 
political stake in disclosure versus nondisclosure; indeed, their interests 
may even cut in favor of disclosure.174 Due to their relative impartiality, 
FOIA administrators would be more accurate in their categorization of 
records than the individuals creating or receiving the email records.  
B.  Increasing Security 
Allowing government employees to transmit government records on 
personal email accounts is fraught with risk.175 Bringing all (or, at least, 
more) government emails under the protection of government servers 
would yield significant security improvements. Given the sensitivity and 
importance of information handled by organizations like the Departments 
of State and Defense, these risks should be minimized to the greatest 
degree possible. The best way to achieve consistent and comprehensive 
security of our government’s valuable digital information is to restrict 
transmission of official emails to accounts of official networks.  
A consistent “security fence” protecting the lot of government emails 
is needed to reduce the risks posed by the transmission of official emails 
on unprotected servers.176 By neglecting to use a State Department email 
address during her tenure, Hillary Clinton ostensibly rejected protection 
by the State Department’s IT department and the National Security 
Agency.177 Of course, she could have enjoyed similarly sophisticated 
defenses with an email address hosted by an email provider like Yahoo 
or Gmail,178 but even security provided by Internet companies varies 
between providers and cannot guarantee an account will not be hacked.179 
The most important security benefit of this Note’s solution is enhanced 
consistency of email protection across the spectrum of government 
emails.  
                                                                                                                     
 173. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (2012). 
 174. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1047–48 (2008) (“Many of the decisions regarding FOIA requests are 
made at a line level by career bureaucrats who have no political stake in disclosure or 
nondisclosure and who can do their jobs most easily by following regulations in good faith.”). 
 175. See supra Section III.B. 
 176. See Greenberg, supra note 137. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See Zetter, supra note 142. 
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C.  Modernizing Information Technology 
While enhancing the consistency of officials’ email protections would 
be a major security improvement, inadequacies of government IT should 
not be ignored. Government agencies have been criticized of late for their 
vulnerability to cyber threats and their antiquated IT. Significant 
investment is needed to meet these challenges. 
In recent years, government agencies have repeatedly been the targets 
of successful hacking attacks.180 Notably, hackers recently breached the 
State Department’s unclassified email system—one of the very systems 
this Note suggests would be preferable to a personal email account.181 
Some have even made the case that email accounts hosted by private 
Internet companies are less prone to hacks than government email 
accounts.182 
Inspections of federal agencies’ IT systems confirm the anecdotal 
evidence that these systems are deficient. A recent study examining 
federal information security found “persistent weaknesses at 
agencies . . . demonstrat[ing] the need for improved security.”183 A 
separate audit concluded that State Department information-security 
protocols did not meet federal requirements.184  
Beyond questions of email security, some have complained that 
government IT is outdated and inefficient.185 One former federal 
employee likened working for the government to “stepping in a time 
machine.”186 Moreover, secure mobile phones capable of handling 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See David Alexander, The OPM Hack Was a Lot Worse than Previously Disclosed, 
HUFFPOST POL. (Sept. 23, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opm-
hack_5602f64be4b08820d91b59c2; US Centcom Twitter Account Hacked by Pro-IS Group, BBC 
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30785232. 
 181. See Nicky Woolf, State Department Email Attack ‘Fits Pattern’ of Russian Hackers, 
Says Expert, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/nov/17/state-department-email-attack-shutdown. From the State Department’s 
perspective, the proverbial silver lining is that it was contained to the Department’s unclassified 
email system, and no classified information was stolen. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 16. 
 183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-714, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY: 
AGENCIES NEED TO CORRECT WEAKNESSES AND FULLY IMPLEMENT SECURITY PROGRAMS 18–23, 
54 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672801.pdf. 
 184. Cory Bennett, State Dept. Cybersecurity Still Lagging, Audit Finds, HILL (Nov. 20, 
2015, 3:02 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/260942-state-department-cybersecurity-
still-lagging-audit-finds. 
 185. Klapper et al., supra note 135 (quoting a State Department policy chief’s complaint that 
Department technology is “so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high 
officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly 
and effectively”). 
 186. Johnson, supra note 16. 
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classified information are practically inaccessible.187 Several others have 
called for the modernization of government IT.188  
Investment aimed at shoring up flimsy digital defenses could 
significantly reduce the frequency of successful hacks against the 
government and could make official email accounts and servers safer than 
private ones.189 The cost of operating the classification system is 
estimated at $14.98 billion.190 In light of this enormous expense, the 
federal government should prioritize the modernization of IT that could 
imperil classified information if neglected further. These improvements 
would make compliance with transparency laws easier, enabling more 
complete and secure record preservation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hillary Clinton email event sheds light on the extensive 
shortcomings of current records-retention laws. The conflict of interest 
inherent in today’s self-regulation scheme causes a large proportion of 
email records to elude preservation. Further, antiquated and inefficient 
government IT causes many government employees to opt to use private 
email instead of their official accounts, compounding the issue even 
further. These emails, which inhabit private email servers, can be 
practically immune from oversight and thus circumvent transparency 
laws. Beyond that, security measures protecting private servers are often 
lacking and can leave sensitive information vulnerable to hacking. 
To address the issues associated with government emails on private 
accounts, the practice of sending such emails should be prohibited. 
Additionally, government IT should be modernized to securely meet the 
demands of government employees who are connected to their email 
                                                                                                                     
 187. Robert O’Harrow Jr., How Clinton’s Email Scandal Took Root, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-clintons-email-scandal-took-root/
2016/03/27/ee301168-e162-11e5-846c-10191d1fc4ec_story.html (noting a request by Clinton for 
a secure mobile device which was “rebuffed” by the NSA). Due to the vast amounts of 
government communications that are classified, being unable to access these documents from 
anywhere but a work computer is more than a modest hindrance.  
 188. Suzanne Nossel, Don’t Blame Hillary for the Classified Email Scandal, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/30/dont-blame-hillary-for-the-classified-
email-scandal-state-department-servers/ (noting that the State Department did not offer 
employees access to cell phones equipped to handle classified emails during Clinton’s term as 
Secretary of State); James Reinl, CIA Director Hack by Teen Spotlights US Cyber-Frailty, 
ALJAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2015, 1:34 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/cia-
director-hack-teen-spotlights-cyber-frailty-151024123451489.html. 
 189. Id. (“The US and other cyber-spying governments use their resources looking to exploit 
cracks in their rivals’ systems rather than finding and patching their own vulnerabilities. . . . ‘If 
all the governments and private sectors around the world invested money and cooperated on 
cyber-security and actually provided this as a public good like we do with national security, we 
could change the trajectory.’”). 
 190. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 98, at 23.    
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around the clock. These changes will preserve and protect the 
government’s emails. To continue without real change is to perpetuate a 
faltering system.  
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